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In re JOSEPH GRIFFIN on Habeas Corpus.
[la, Ib] Criminal Law-Judgment and Sentence-ProbationDura.tion of Authority to Modify or Revoke-After a probationary period has expired, the court does not lose jurisdiction
of the subject matter, but it exceeds its jurisdiction under
Pen. Code, § 1203.3, if it then revokes or modifies its order
suspending the imposition or execution of sentence and admiting the defendant to probation.
[2] ld.-Judgment and Sentence-Probation-Review-Habeas
Corpus.-Habeas corpus lies to review and correct court action
in excess of its jurisdiction under Pen. Code, § 1203.3, governing revocation, modification and termination of a defendant's
probation and his discharge.
[3] Courts-Jurisdietion-Aequisition-Estoppel.-The rule that
jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel relates to subject
matter jurisdiction, namely, the court's power to hear and
determine the cause.
4] ld.-Jurisdietion-Acquisition-Estoppel.-When a court has
jurisdiction of the subject matter, a party who seeks or consents to action beyond the court's power as defined by statute
or decisional rule may be estopped to complain of the ensuing
action in excess of jurisdiction, the determination of such
estoppel depending on the importance of the irregularity not
only to the parties but to the functioning of the courts and in
some instances on other considerations of public policy.
[6] Criminal Law-Judgment and Sentence-Probation-Duration
of Authority to Modify or Revoke: Estoppel - Excess of
Jurisdiction.-A trial court's determination that a probationer
was estopped to deny the court's jurisdiction in revoking
probation and sentencing him to prison was in harmony with
the proper operation of the probation system, and such
estoppel was not precluded by any substantive or procedural
policy, where, although the revocation was made after his
probation period had elapsed, the probationer had himself
invited the excess of jurisdiction by seeking and obtaining a
continuance to obtain private counsel, the continuance itself

r

[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Courts, § 82; Am.Jur.2d, Courts, § 95.
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 363; Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law,
§ 567.
MeK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 997; [2] Criminal
Law, § 998(6); [3, 4] Courts, § 66; [5] Criminal Law, § 997;
Estoppel, § 6; [6] Criminal Law, § 981.
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being granted before the expiration of the probationary
period, when the court could properly have ordered immediate
revocation, regardless of counsel, and continued merely the
determination on the alternatives of reinstatement of probation or imposition of sentence.
[6] Id. - Judgment and Sentence - Time to Pronounce - Revocation of ·Probation. - When imposition of sentence has been
suspended, judgment can be pronounced at any time after the
timely revocation of probation.
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PROCEEDING in habeaa corpus to secure release from
custody. Order to show cause discharged, writ denied.
Charles L. Lippitt and Jerome S. Billett for Petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James,
Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas S. Kerrigan, Deputy
Attorney· General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner was cllarged with four counts
of grand theft and five of forgery. He pleaded guilty to count
3 (grand theft) and count 9 (forgery). On July 23, 1963, th,
superior court suspended imposition of sentence on these
counts, dismissed the other charges, and granted petitioner
probation for the term of three years.
The probation report showed that in his work as an insurance adjuster petitioner obtained approximately $20,000 by
thefts and forgeries. He attributed his criminal activities to a
need for money that arose from a compulsion to gamble. The
conditions of probation were that he spend the first six
months of the three-year term in the county jail, that he make
restitution through the probatio,n officer in amounts and
manner to be prescribed by that officer, and that he not
gamble. After petitioner had been in jail for three months the
court modified the probation order to permit his immediate
release because he represented that he would be able to obtain
employment and begin restitution. Petitioner agreed with the
probation officer that beginning in February 1964 he would
make payments to that officer of about $100 a month toward
restitution.
Petitioner did not make these payments as agreed. On July
7, 1964, he appeared with counsel for a hearing on the probation officer's report of violations. The court modified the
probation order to require petitioner to pay $125 a month to
the probation officer toward restitution. Petitioner did not
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make these payments. He issued bad checks and engaged in
illegal schemes similar to those resulting in the original criminal charges. On August 23, 1965, he again appeared with
counsel for a hearing as to his violations of the conditions of
probation. The court ordered probation continued with the
additional condition that petitioner sign no checks.
Petitioner continued to violate the conditions of probation.
On JUly 5, 1966, he appeared without counsel for a hearing as
to revocation of probation. This appearance and the ensuing
proceedings were before a judge who had not previously
heard the case. Through the public defender petitioner moved
for a month's continuance to obtain private counsel. The
court continued the matter to August 2, 1966. No one mentioned that the period of probation would expire on July
22.
On August 2 petitioner appeared with counsel who was new
to the case. Petitioner's counsel and the deputy district attorney argued the merits of the probation officer's recommendation that probation be revoked. No one mentioned that the
three-year term of probation had expired. The court ordered
probation revoked. The judge stated that he would sentence
petitioner to the state prison, but at petitioner's request he
continued the matter one week.
.
After the hearing on August 2, petitioner called his counsel's attention to the expiration of the probationary term.
Counsel had not known that the term had expired. He
promptly served and filed a memorandum contending that
upon the expiration of the probationary period the court lost
jurisdiction to revoke probation. After further hearings the
court determined that on July 5, when petitioner requested a
month's continuance, he knew that the probationary term
would end on July 23, and that by knowingly seeking and
obtaining the continuance beyond the termination date he
waived his right to insist on the jurisdictional nature of
timely revocation of probation. On August 16, 1966, the court
sentenced petitioner to the state prison on counts 5 and 9. 1
Although the order revoking probation could have been
reviewed on an appeal from the ensuing judgment (People v.
Robinson (1954) 43 Ca1.2d 143, 145 [271 P.2d 872]), petiIThe imposition of sentence on count 5 was an obvious clerical error,
for petitioner had pleaded guilty to eounts 3 and 9 and the other counts
had been dismissed. The superior court can correct the error on its own
motion. (Bogart v. Superior Court (1964) 230 Ca1.App.2d 874, 875 [41
Ca1.Rptr.480].)
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tioner did not appeal. Instead, after having applied
unsucc('ssfully for habeas corpus in the courts below, he now
seeks the writ in this court.
Penal Code section 1203.32 provides that the court shall
have authority to revoke or modify probation "at any time
during the' term of probation." [1&] The cases have
consistently taken the view announced in People v. O'DonneU
(1918) 37 Cal.App. 192, 196-197 [174 P. 102], that "the statute itself furnishes the measure of the power which may thus
be exercised" and "the court loses jurisdiction or power to
make an order revoking or modifying the order suspending
the imposition of sentence or the execution thereof and
admitting the defendant to probation after the probationary
period has expired." (See People v. WiUiams (1944) 24
Ca1.2d 848, 854 [151 P.2d 244] ; People v. Siegel (1965) 235
Cal.App.2d 522, 524 [45 Cal.Rptr. 530]; People v. Jordan
(1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 7, 11 [37 Cal.Rptr. 738]; People v.
Mason (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 182, 191 [7 Cal.Rptr. 525];
People v. Blume (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 474, 481-482 [7
Cal.Rptr. 16]; People v. Blaketnan (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d
596, 599 [339 P.2d 202] ; People v. Brown (1952) 111 Cal.
App.2d 406, 408 [244 P.2d 702].) [2] Habeas corpus lies to
review and correct action in excess of the jurisdiction defined
by section 1203.3. (In f'e Olark (1959) 51 Ca1.2d 838,840 [337
P.2d 67] ; Ex parte Slattery (1912) 163 Cal. 176, 178 [124 P.
856] ; see Fayad v. Superior Oourt (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 79,
82 [313 P.2d 669] [mandate directing the superior court to
discharge petitioner from a probationary term that had been
extended beyond the statutory maximum].)
[3] Petitioner contends that because timely revocation of
probation is " jurisdictional" the rule that jurisdiction
cannot be conferred by estoppel applies. That rule relates to
subject matter jurisdiction, the court's power to hear and
determine the cause. (Summers v. Superior Court (1959) 59
Cal.2d 295, 298 [347 P.2d 668] ; In re Johannes (1931) 213
Cal. 125, 131 [1 P.2d 984] ; In re Garrity (1929) 97 Cal.App.
372, 376 [275 P. 480] ; People v. Titus (1927) 85 Cal.App.
2Section 1203.3: ' 'The court shall have authority at any time during
the term of probation to revoke, modify, or cbange its order of suspension of imposition or execution of sentence. • . • [I]n all cases, if the
court bas not seen fit to revoke the order of probation and impose sentence or pronoun('e judgment, the dcfend:mt shall at the end of the term
of probation or any extenbion thereof, be by the court discharged subject
to the provisions of these sections."
The discharge of the defendant referred to in section 1203.3 is pro- \
vided for in section 1203.4, quoted infra, fn. 3.
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413, 416 [259 P. 465] ; see People v. Granice (1875) 50 Cal.
447,448-449; 13 Cal.Jur.2d, Courts, § 82.)
[Ib] The jurisdictional concept involved in the cases
holding that the court is without power to revoke probation
after the end of the probationary term is not lack of jurisdiction of the cause but excess of jurisdiction. (See the discussion in Ex parte Slattery (1912) supra, 163 Cal. 176, 178, anti
People v. O'Donnell (1918) supra, 37 Cal. App. 192, 196-197.)
Neither the probation statutes nor the cases applying them
support a holding that expiration of the probationary period
terminates the court's jurisdiction of the subject matter. The
statutes themselves contemplate that such fundamental jurisdiction continues, for they provide for the court's determination of certain matters after the end of the probationary
term. 3
[4] When, as here, the court has jurisdiction of the
subject, a party who seeks or consents to action beyond the
court's power as defined by statute or decisional rule may be
estopped to complain of the ensuing action in excess of jurisdiction. (City of Los Angel.es v. Cole (1946) 28 Ca1.2d 509,
515 [170 P.2d 928]; Guardianship of Di Carlo (1935) 3
Ca1.2d 225, 228-229 [44 P.2d 562, 99 A;L.R. 990] ; People v.
Patrick (1897) 118 Cal. 332, 333 [50 P. 425]; Hoshollr v.
County of Contra Costa (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 602, 605 [21
Cal.Rptr. 714] ; Phillips v. Beilsten (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d
SPenal Code section 1203.4 provides that "Every defendant who has
fulfilled the conditions of his probation for the entire period thereof, or
who shall have been discharged from probation prior to the termination
of the period thereof, shall at any time thereafter be permitted by the
court to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty; or if
he has been convicted after a plea of not guilty, the court shall set aside
the verdict of guilty j and in either case the court shall thereupon dismiss
the accusations or infomlation against such defendant, who shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities [with some exceptions] resulting from the offense or crime of which he has been convicted. "
On application of a defendant who meets the requirements of section
1203.4 the court not only can. but must proceed in accord with that
statute. (People v. Bradley (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 887, 889 [57 Cal.
Rptr. 82]; People v. Johnson (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 140, 144 [285 P.2d
74]; see Ex parte Slattery (1912) BUpra, 163 Cal. 176.)
Penal Code section 17 provides, "Where a court grants probation to
a defendant without imposition of sentence upon conviction of a crime
punishable in the discretion of the court by imprisonment in the state
prison or imprisonment in the county jail, the court may at the time of
granting probation, or, on application of defendant or probation officer
thereafter, declare the offense to be a misdemeanor." The court's power
and duty to pass on such an application for reduction of the offense to
a misdemeanor continues after the end of the probationary term. (Meyer
v. Superior Co-urt (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 133, 139 [55 Cal.Rptr. 350].)
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450, 457 [330 P.2d 912] ; Munns v. Stenman (1957) 152 Cal.
App.2d 543, 557-558 [314 P.2d 67] ; Blue v. Superior Co-urt
(1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 278, 285 [305 P.2d 209]; see 30A
Am.Jur., Judgments, § 47; 21 C.J.S., Courts, §§ 108, 109.)
Whether he shall be estopped depends on the importance of
the irregularity not only to the parties but to the functioning
of the courts and in some instances on other considerations of
public policy. A litigant who has stipulated to a procedure in
excess of jurisdiction may be estopped to question it when
"To hold otherwise would permit the parties to trifle with the
courts." (City of Los Angeles v. Cole (1946) supra, 28
Cal.2d 509, 515.) On the other hand waiver of procedural
requirements may not be permitted when the allowance of a
deviation would lead to confusion in the processing of other
cases by other litigants. (Tabor v. Superior Court 0946) 28
Cal.2d 505, 508-509 [170 P .2d 667].) Substantive rules based
on public policy sometimes control the allowance or disallowance of estoppel. For example, People v. Blakeman (1959)
supra, 170 Cal.App.2d 596, 598, held that a defendant who
requested and received probation conditioned on banishment
was not estopped to attack the condition, for public policy
forbids banishment and "The law cannot suffer the state's.
interest· a~d concern in the observance and enforcement of·
this policy to be thwarted through the guise of waiver of a
personal right by an individual." On the other hand a party
who has procured a divorce decree is estopped to claim later
that it is invalid. In that situation a rule of substantive law
based on public policy prevents his questioning even the jurisdictional fact of domicile. (Spellens v. Spellens (1957) 49
Cal.2d 210, 218-221 [317 P.2d 613]; Rediker v. Rediker
(1950) 35 Ca1.2d 796,805-808 [221 P.2d 1, 20 A.L.R.2d 1152] ;
Union Bank ({1 Trust Co. v. Gordon (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d
681,685 [254 P.2d 644].)
[5] In the present case no policy, substantive or procedural precludes estoppel of petitioner to attack the excess of
jurisdiction that resulted from the granting of his motion for
a continuance. The trial court's determination that he is
estopped is in harmony with the proper operation of the
proba tion system.
By seeking a continuance to a time beyond the end of the
probationary term petitioner asked the court to do in a manner
that was in excess of jurisdiction what it could have done
properly by immediately revoking probation and continuing
the matter for a hearing and determination as to the alterna-
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tives of reinstatement of probation or imposition of sentence.
The court could have revoked probation without affording
petitioner the opportunity to obtain counsel; indeed it could
have made the order of revocation ex parte. (In re Levi
(1952) 39 Cal.2d 41, 44 [244 P.2d 403] ; In re Davis (1951)
37 Ca1.2d 872, 874-875 [236 P.2d 579].) [6] It could then
have continued the matter to a suitable time for hearing, for
when imposition of sentence has been suspended judgment can
be pronounced at any time after the timely revocation of
probation. (People v. Williams (1944) supra, 24 Cal.2d 848,
854.) Before the pronouncement of judgment petitioner could
have moved the court to set aside its order revoking probation
and to place him on probation again (Pen. Code, § 1203.2.)
These procedures would have proteGted both petititioner's
right to counsel on arraignment for judgment (Cal. Const.,
art. I, § 13 ; In re Perez (1966) 65 Cal.2d 224, 229 [53 Cal.
Rptr.414, 418 P.2d 6]) and the court's jurisdiction.
Petitioner invokes the rule of certain civil cases that the
defendant is entitled to a dismissal even though his own
conduct caused the plaintiff's failure to proceed within the
time prescribed by sections 581a and 583 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. (E.g., Miller &7 Lux Inc. v. Super·ior Court (1923)
192 Cal. 333, 339-340 [219 P. 1006] ; Siskiyou County Bank v.
Hoyt (1901) 132 Cal. 81, 84 [64 P. 118].) On the other hand
it has been suggested that we might find support for the trial
court's determination in cases applying the doctrine of
waiver against a defendant who seeks or does not object to a
continuance beyond the time periods prescribed for criminal
cases by section 1382 of the Penal Code. (E.g,. People v.
Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, 145-154 [32 Cal.Rptr. 44, 383
P.2d 452].) None of the civil or criminal dismissal statutes is
significantly similar to the probation statutes. The civil cases
as to dismissal are not persuasive in support of petitioner nor
are the criminal cases persuasive against him. What we have
said as to the operation of the probation system shows that
application of estoppel here is appropriate under the statutes
dealing with that subject.
The order to show cause is discharged and the petition for a
writ of habeas corpus is denied.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
and Sullivan, J., concurred.

)

For these many reasons it is obvious that a corporate bond
complies with the statutory requirements and that the
peremptory writ should issue.
The parties have neither raised nor briefed the question
whether mandate is an appropriate remedy since petitioner
could have ha'd a judgment of dismissal entered, and then'
appealed. It is a debatable question whether the remedy by
appeal would here be adequate. Moreover, the point at issue
has been fully briefed and argued by the parties. If we were
to compel the parties to proceed by way of appeal only delay
and expense would be accomplished which would prejudice
the courts and the parties (Shively v. Stewart, 65 Ca1.2d 475,
481 [55 CalRptr. 217, 421 P.2d 65]; Hagan v. 8uperior
Court, 53 Cal.2d 498, 502 [2 Cal. Rptr. 288, 348 P.2d 896]).
Under such circumstances the writ should issue.
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue ordering the
respondent court to accept the corporate bond proifered, and '
to take such other steps as the proceedings require.
.
i

,
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Traynor, C. ~., McComb, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., .Burke,
J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.

